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BOOK REVIEW
Super Chief: Earl Warren and his Supreme Court-A Judicial Biogra-
phy. Bernard Schwartz. New York: New York University Press. 1983.
Pp. xiii, 853. $29.95.
Inside the Warren Court. Bernard Schwartz with Stephan Lesher.
Garden City: Doubleday & Co. 1983. Pp. i, 299. $17.95.
Eugene Gressman*
These are court secrets primeval; the murmuring judges and the
law clerks. These are what the publishers of Super Chief have touted
as "the definitive record of the deliberations of the Warren Court"
and "the first documented behind-the-scenes account ever published
of how the Supreme Court decides cases."' Indeed, these are docu-
mented and seemingly authentic reenactments of the Court's "secret"
decisional processes during the sixteen-term Warren period, 1953 to
1969.
Professor Schwartz has an impeccable record as a constitutional
scholar and law professor; when he writes about the Supreme Court
he knows whereof he speaks. In this instance, he has spoken twice at
the same time. He speaks loudest and strongest in Super Chief, a self-
styled unabridged edition of a shorter satellite version written with
Stephan Lesher, entitled Inside the Warren Court. Mr. Lesher, a
former Newsweek correspondent who covered the Supreme Court on
his reportorial rounds, did most of the writing for that version, relying
on the more scholarly Super Chief to supply the massive documentary
and oral evidence of "what went on behind the scenes in the Warren
Court." 2 In the shorter version, the authors repeat many of the juicier
judicial remarks that appear in more authenticated fashion in Super
Chief.
And so back to Super Chief. Professor Schwartz notes in the preface
that the Supreme Court's conference lists and votes, as well as the
individual discussions and notes of the Justices, are "normally not
made public" and that the Court's conferences "are, of course, com-
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pletely private-attended only by the Justices themselves."'3 The se-
crecy of the conference, we are rightly told, "is, indeed, one of the
great continuing Court traditions."'4 Unfortunately, the perpetuation
of this tradition is shattered in the very next sentence, in which
Professor Schwartz blandly asserts that he has "tried to reconstruct the
conferences in most of the cases discussed, including all the important
cases decided by the Warren Court." 5 So much for the tradition of
secrecy.
How was this wall of secrecy breached? The preface candidly ad-
mits access by Professor Schwartz to the following: (1) private notes of
the conference discussions, as well as the private records of votes taken
at conference, compiled by Justices who were present (apparently not
all of whom are deceased); (2) non-conference correspondence, dia-
ries, memoranda and draft opinions of members of the Warren Court,
"including, but not limited to" the papers of deceased members that
have been deposited in library collections; (3) some documents and
notes, most of which have never been published, that "were made
available upon a confidential basis"; (4) oral sources in the form of the
author's personal interviews with "some thirty former law clerks of
Chief Justice Warren . . . as well as clerks of other Justices" of the
Warren period; (5) discussions with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
and "all the living members of the Warren Court, except Justice
Thurgood Marshall"; and (6) a miscellany of non-judicial interviews
and acknowledgements of help.6 Each of the non-confidential docu-
ments used in the book is identified in the footnotes, including its
location and authorship.
Similar anti-secrecy devices were used by Woodward and Arm-
strong in writing The Brethren,7 which details the Court's decisional
secrets for six terms (1969-1975) following the Warren era. That book
was based on interviews with several Justices, more than 170 former
law clerks, and several dozen former employees of the Court, "unpub-
lished material that was made available to [the authors] by dozens of
sources who had access to the documents," and "internal memoranda
between Justices, letters, notes taken at conference, case assignment
sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts of opinions and, in several in-
stances, drafts that were never circulated even to the other Justices." 8
In sum, in the words of the two authors, "[b]y the time we had
concluded our research, we had filled eight file drawers with thou-




6. Id. at xi-xii.
7. B. Woodward & C. Armstrong, The Brethren (1979).
8. Id. at 3-4.
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sands of pages of documents from the chambers of eleven of the twelve
Justices who served during the period 1969 to 1976," and "[i]n virtu-
ally every instance we had at least one, usually two, and often three or
four reliable sources in the chambers of each Justice for each of the
seven years we have covered.""
The most striking common denominator of Super Chief and The
Brethren is the casting of the cloak of journalistic confidentiality on
those associated in some way with the Court who supplied the authors
with internal documents, memoranda and draft opinions, to say noth-
ing of recalled oral conversations. To be sure, some of these items are
available in library collections of the papers of deceased Justices,
although prudence would dictate that papers relating to the internal
operations of the Court not be open to public inspection until a
reasonably lengthy time has elapsed. The critical point, however,
implicitly acknowledged by all who demand anonymity when turning
over material to outside reporters, is that these inteinal documents are
and must be institutional in nature. When participating in the Court's
decisional processes, no individual Justice acquires such a personal fee
title to a collegial document or conversation as to permit release to the
press. The repeated statements of Justices that maintenance of the
secrecy of the conference is essential to the integrity of the decisional
processes of the Court belie any individual freedom to undermine that
integrity. The Court's pronouncement with respect to the presumptive
presidential privilege in United States v. Nixon 0 probably applies
equally to the Court's claim of institutional confidentiality:
[T]he importance of this confidentiality [of communications be-
tween high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them in the performance of their manifold duties] is too plain to
require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests
to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his con-
versations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of
judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those
values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in can-
did, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be free
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately.... The privilege is fundamental to the operation
9. Id. at 4.
10. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution."
Thus, to the extent that Super Chief is grounded on breaches of the
"confidentiality of judicial deliberations," the very writing of the book
raises most troubling problems. The media and the historians, of
course, assert that there are no limits to the public interest in full
disclosure of all that happens within a public institution, and that it
makes no difference how such disclosure takes place. But that kind of
public interest must be weighed against the kind described in the
Nixon decision. History suggests that the balance favors the latter
interest, particularly when one adds an additional factor that so often
accompanies an outside scribe's attempt to reconstruct past collegial
events within the Court. That factor is a compound of incomplete-
ness, ignorance and inaccuracies on the part of a reporter or "judicial
biographer" who played no role, even as a first-hand observer, in the
decisional events as they occurred. Decision-making among nine Su-
preme Court Justices is a very complex and subtle drama, filled with
constant subdramas on both individual and collective levels. It is
doubtful that anyone can accurately recapture the development of
any given decision by looking at someone else's file of correspondence
and draft opinions relating to that case. After all, these Justices pride
themselves on being fiercely independent of each other, particularly in
terms of reaching their own judgments and decisions.
Still another troubling problem is the probability that many of the
anonymous tattlers of judicial tales in this book were former law
clerks. If that actually happened, as it certainly did in the preparation
of The Brethren, such action borders on the unethical. Law clerks are
not members of the Court. They have no moral authority, even after
they leave the Court, to make public disclosure of documents, draft
opinions or conversations of a decision-making nature that came to
their attention in the course of their duties. At most, a law clerk can
observe the whole of the collegial process only through the eyes and
mouth of the one Justice for whom he works; what the Justice does not
tell him, or what he is not otherwise privy to, the clerk knoweth not.
The law clerk, in short, is not a very reliable witness to decisional
motivations of the Justices. Nor, if he has any sense of loyalty to the
Court or to the Justice for whom he works, is the clerk free to divulge
confidential communications, memoranda or draft opinions that he
observed while serving his Justice.
Super Chief is a well-written, interesting, but deceptive account of
what went on behind the Court's red velour curtains during the years
of Earl Warren's stewardship. It contains many gossipy insights into
the personalities of the Chief Justice and of those who served with
11. Id. at 705-08 (emphasis added).
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him. But I am troubled by the numerous revelations of conference
discussions, changed votes, drafts and redrafts of opinions, and results
that might have been. I am not certain that these accounts are totally
accurate, fair or complete, particularly because they are shrouded in
anonymous sources. Moreover, I am not convinced that all this after
the fact tale-tattling makes any difference to the bar or to the public.
Does it really advance our understanding of the law, or of how the
Supreme Court operates behind the scenes? Why aren't we content to
judge the Warren Court by what its reported opinions proclaim? Why
not allow the things said in a tentative collegial context, some of
which are not very tidy or nice, to rest in peace? There is nothing
conspiratorial or unusual or even useful about them; they are what
one might expect from any heated debate among nine people about
some of the most difficult legal problems arising in our judicial sys-
tem.
The bottom line is a feeling of embarrassment for the Court at this
latest intrusion into its right of privacy in its internal deliberations.
Will Super Chief, in conjunction with its shorter version and with the
earlier The Brethren, chill the spirit of free, open and robust debate
within the halls and conference room of the Supreme Court?
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